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ABSTRACT 
The strategic role of plants is an important decision variable in the design of 
international plant networks. The framework introduced by Ferdows in the 1990s 
offers an interesting typology, classifying plants according to their strategic role. 
Empirical research testing the framework showed its value as a tool for the analysis 
and assessment of the role of plants in such networks. This paper reports on a follow-
up of this empirical study, ten years later. It shows that the typology has predictive 
value for the future perspectives of the plant. While most of the lead plants have 
survived, several off-shore and source plants, and some of the server and contributor 
plants have disappeared from the network. As such, the framework can be useful for 
plant managers whose objective is to safeguard the future of their plant, as well as for 
executives in headquarters, who design and redesign plant networks for future 
competitiveness.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In the design of an international manufacturing network, executives decide on 
the location of their plants, the focus and specialization of their plants, the capacity of 
their plants, as well as the role the plants will play in the network. They need to 
balance carefully a top-down and a bottom-up perspective. On the one hand, they need 
to decide on the strategic priorities of the network, and thus they need to set goals and 
objectives for each of the plants. On the other hand, they need to understand the 
dynamic capabilities of each of the plants, and will try to exploit these capabilities 
optimally. 
The architecture of plant networks will evolve over time, in response to 
changes in the economical and social environment and to the moves of competitors. 
Plant capabilities may grow or may get lost. The role of the plants, therefore, will 
evolve over time. This evolution in the role of the plants may be driven by the 
enthusiasm of plant managers who take initiatives and who build on their plant’s 
competencies. Or it may be driven by top-down decisions of headquarters, based on 
benchmarking of the plants in the network. For example, as markets grow or decline, 
or as labor costs increase, a plant in a certain region may loose its location advantage 
in the network, and may have to down-size or even close. 
This paper reports on a longitudinal research project, carried out in eight 
multinational companies over the past ten years. They all are manufacturing 
companies, with headquarters in Western Europe, and with plants in several regions in 
the world. 
We had studied these eight multinationals in 1995-1996. We revisited them in 
2005-2006, to study how these companies had changed their manufacturing network. 
In both research rounds, our goal has been to identify the strategic role of each of the 
plants in the network they were part of. Our main hypothesis was that the current 
strategic role of the plant in the network has predictive value for the future role of the 
plant. In this paper we explain and test this hypothesis, and we draw some lessons for 
practitioners. 
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The “strategic role of the plant” has been conceptualized first through the 
typology of plants developed by Ferdows (Ferdows, 1989, Ferdows, 1997). Ferdows’ 
framework describes six possible types of factories, based on two dimensions (see 
Figure 1): 
 
 The primary advantage for exploiting the plant, that is, market proximity, 
availability of low-cost input factors, and availability of skills or know-how. 
 The degree of contribution of the plant to the company’s strategy, ranging 
from “low” for factories that have as their sole role to get products produced, 
to “high” for factories that do not only produce products, but are also important 
developers and providers of know-how for the other plants in the network. 
Another way of defining this second dimension is by referring to the plant’s 
competence, which may include, next to production, also process technical 
maintenance, procurement, local logistics, production planning, product and 
process development and improvement, development of suppliers, the supply 
of global markets, and a global hub role for product and process knowledge. 
(Ferdows, 1997) In what follows, we will label this vertical axis as the “level of 
strategic role” of the plant. 
 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
 
Ferdows introduced the framework as a typology that helps to describe and 
understand the position of plants in the manufacturing network. In our earlier work, 
we have tested the framework on 8 companies with 59 plants in total and we 
concluded that the framework proved indeed to be useful for the description and 
assessment of plant networks (Vereecke and Van Dierdonck, 2002). 
Ferdows also insisted on the dynamics in this model. He described some 
natural changes in the strategic role of a plant, as is also suggested in the graphical 
representation of the framework (see Figure 1). Our recent research now offers 
empirical data that allows us to test this evolution, over a period of ten years.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Ten years ago (1995-1996) we carried out exploratory case research in eight 
multinational companies (Vereecke et al, 2006). Data were gathered at two levels of 
analysis: the plant and the company. 
 
− Interviews were conducted with the general manager and with 
manufacturing managers at headquarters, using a structured questionnaire 
with closed and open-ended questions as a guide through the interviews.  
− A second questionnaire was sent to the plant managers and/or the 
manufacturing managers in the distinct production plants.  
 
In the second round of the research carried out in 2005-2006, with the support 
of “Flanders District of Creativity”, interviews have been conducted with one or two 
managers in the headquarters of each of the companies. We have again used a 
structured questionnaire as the basis of the interviews. They were explained our 
original model and were asked to rate the still existing and new plants on their 
strategic role. 
 
We have measured the level of the strategic role of the plant on a 9-point 
Likert scale, and have asked our respondents to score all plants in the network on this 
scale. The following descriptions have been attached to the scores: 
 
1 The main goal of the plant is "to get the products produced". Managerial 
investment in the plant is focused on running the plant efficiently.  
3 The plant has sufficient internal capabilities to develop and improve its own 
components, products and production processes   
5 The plant is a focal point in the company for the development of specific 
important components, products or production processes    
7 The plant develops and contributes know-how for the company   
9 The plant is a "center of excellence", and serves as a partner of headquarters in 
building strategic capabilities in the manufacturing function 
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We have asked our respondents to indicate on a list of potential reasons for 
exploiting plants the three main reasons for each of the plants. In the 1995-1996 study, 
we had asked them to indicate the primary reasons for establishing the plant initially, 
as well as the primary advantage for (still) having the plant at that time (that is in 
1995-1996). In the 2005-2006 study we have asked them to indicate the primary 
advantage for having the plant to date (that is in 2005-2006). This allows us to 
compare over time the advantages plant locations offer to the network as a whole. 
 
RESEARCH RESULTS 
A detailed discussion of the conclusions from the 1995-1996 study can be 
found in some of our earlier publications (Vereecke and De Meyer, 2006, Vereecke 
and Van Dierdonck, 2002, Vereecke et al., 2006). In this paper, we summarize the 
main conclusions that matter in the comparison of the strategic role of the plant today 
(2005-2006) and 10 years ago (1995-1996). 
The eight multinationals studied in 1995-1996 consisted of 59 plants: 42 plants 
were located in Europe, spread over 14 different countries. The other 17 plants were 
spread over 10 different countries in East Asia and the Middle East, the USA and 
Canada, South Africa and Australia. We thus had a truly international sample.  
One of the conclusions from the 1995-1996 study was that our empirical data 
supported Ferdows’ model, as can be seen in Figure 2. We concluded that the main 
advantage of exploiting the plants fell into the three categories put forward by 
Ferdows: proximity to inputs (mainly low-cost labor), proximity to the market, and 
access to know-how and skills. We did however observe a number of plants with 
market proximity as their main advantage, and yet a high level of strategic role. Such 
plants were not described in Ferdows’ model. It showed that the availability of skills 
and know-how were not the only, and not even the main driver for the existence of 
centers of excellence. Alternatively, we observed a few plants which had the 
availability of skills and know-how as their primary advantage, but weren’t playing 
the role of lead plants. They also weren’t recognized by Ferdows in his framework. 
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Insert Figure 2 About Here 
As you can observe in Figure 3 the dominant factor explaining plant location 
was the market proximity. We concluded that, even though offshoring for cost 
reductions was important, our multinationals still had the market as their main driver 
for their internationalization strategy. 
 
Insert Figure 3 About Here 
 
By 2005-2006, the 8 multinationals had 83 plants: 42 plants were located in 
Europe, spread over 13 different countries. The other 41 plants were spread over 18 
different countries in East Asia and the Middle East, the USA and Canada, Africa and 
Australia. A first striking change is the increased globalization over the past 10 years. 
In 1995-1996 the plant networks of the 8 multinationals were predominantly European 
with a few sites in other continents. Today they have become truly global. 
Thirty-one percent of the plants which were in the plant network in 1995-1996 
are not there anymore today. Most of these plants have been closed. A few plants have 
been taken over by other companies. Some others were very tight partners, with whom 
the partnership has been stopped. On the other hand, 42 new plants have been 
introduced to the plant networks either through mergers and acquisitions, or as 
greenfield plants (Figure 4). 
 
 
Insert Figure 4 About Here 
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In Figure 5 we positioned these 82 plants in Ferdows’ framework. Like in 
1995-1996, we find some plants with a high level of strategic role that yet have market 
proximity as their main location advantage. These plants seem to act as a center of 
excellence in the network, even though skills and know-how is not their primary 
location advantage. We also observe two plants which have input factors as their main 
advantage, and yet act as center of excellence. Ferdows’ framework falls short of a 
label for such plants. 
It is also interesting to observe that, as in 1995-1996, some plants seem to have 
lost their location advantage at all. 
 
Insert Figure 5 About Here 
As you can see in Figure 6, the market is still the main driving factor behind 
the international plant network of the 8 manufacturing multinationals. 62% of the 
factories (compared to 64% in 1995-1996) have market proximity as the main location 
advantage. The number of factories that have labor cost as their main advantage has 
gone down proportionally, from 15% to about 10%. Obviously, we won’t deny that 
delocalization has taken place. Yet, we have to conclude that cost is not the only, not 
even the main factor in the internationalization strategy of our multinationals. 
 
Insert Figure 6 About Here 
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Table 1 and Table 2 give some details on the location advantage of the plants 
which have disappeared from the networks, the ones that have survived, and the ones 
that have joined the networks over the past ten years. 
 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
Table 1 shows that proportionally less plants which have the market or skills 
and know-how as their main location advantage have disappeared; while 
proportionally more plants which had labor cost as their main advantage have 
disappeared. It will be no surprise that 3 of the 4 plants for which no location 
advantage could be mentioned in 1995-1996 have also disappeared. 
This leads us to the conclusion that skills, know-how and market proximity are 
stable location advantages, while labor cost, and (obviously) the lack of any major 
advantage is a less stable condition for a plant to operate in.  
 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
 
In Table 2 you can see that about half of the plants in today’s network have 
been added to the network over the past 10 years. As stated already earlier, market 
proximity has been a major driver for adding plants to the network. An intriguing 
observation is that, again today, 3 of the plants that have survived are now reported to 
be in a location that is not adding value to the network.  
In Table 3 you can see the average level of the strategic role played by the 
plants, as rated in 1995-1996, and as rated in 2005-2006 (on a 1-to-9 Likert scale). It 
again distinguishes between the plants that have left the network, the ones that have 
survived, and the ones that have joined the network over the past ten years.  
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Insert Table 3 About Here 
 
The plants which have disappeared from the network, on average, were 
playing a lower level of strategic role than the ones that have survived. Also, it is 
striking that the plants which have entered the networks play a lower level of strategic 
role than the plants which have been in the network for more than ten years.  
Figure 7 repeats the figure on the strategic role of the plants, but now indicates 
which of the plants that were in the network in 1995-1996 have survived and which 
have disappeared from the network. 
 
Insert Figure 7 About Here 
In this figure you can see that almost all of the offshore and source plants have 
left the networks. Also, some of the server and contributor plants are gone. And to no 
surprise, the three plants with low level of strategic role, and for which the location 
advantage had disappeared, are not there anymore. 
This suggests that source and offshore plants have an uncertain future, whereas 
the role of the lead plant seems to be provide guaranteed future.  
We conclude from the previous discussion that the strategic role has a 
predictive value for the future of the plant.  
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CONCLUSION 
Over the past ten years, most of the eight multinationals have strongly 
internationalized their manufacturing network. Through mergers, acquisitions and 
greenfield plants, the networks have become truly global. While some of the plants 
abroad have been established to tap into low cost labor, most of the plants abroad have 
been established to tap into new markets. The market was and still is the main driving 
factor behind the international plant network of the 8 manufacturing multinationals. 
This may be somewhat counterintuitive if one would rely on the impressions created 
by the popular press. 
The exploitation of plants in distant markets does not only take place for 
logistical reasons. We also see that the proximity of the market is considered as a 
source of know-how for some companies; some of these plants play the role of centers 
of excellence in the network. 
Some location advantages seem to be more stable than others: The availability 
of skills, the availability of know-how and the market proximity are stable location 
advantages, while the availability of low-cost labor is less stable. Obviously, plants 
which are reported to have lost their location advantages face a less secure future.  
This conclusion holds for all levels of strategic role. That is for plants which 
are in the network for production output only, as well as for plants that develop know-
how and strategic capabilities. Or, using Ferdows’ terminology, almost all of the 
offshore and source plants have left the networks; also some of the server and 
contributor plants are gone. The role of the lead plant seems to provide a guaranteed 
future. 
The conclusions for practitioners differ depending on the perspective taken: the 
plant manager, running his or her plant and building the future role of the plant, or the 
manager in headquarters, overlooking the global manufacturing network of plants.  
The plant manager will remember from this study that the growth and future of 
his or her plant depends on the location advantage of the plant and on the role it plays 
today in relation to the other plants in the network.  
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Each plant is to some extent “in competition” with the other plants in the 
network. In order to safeguard the future of the plant, the plant manager may want to 
tap into location advantages which were not prevalent at the start, but which allow the 
plant to grow in the future. For example, plants which are exploited for reasons of low 
labor cost today, may want to build on skills or market growth for the future. Also, as 
know-how develops in the plant, the plant manager could offer this know-how to the 
other plants in the network. The lead plant, which serves as a center of expertise for 
other plants, will play a crucial role in the overall innovation strategy of the network, 
and therefore have a more guaranteed future. 
For the manager in headquarters on the other hand, the main message is that 
the design of the manufacturing network is more than a decision of what to produce 
where and how to organize the logistic flows. It is also about a strategic view on the 
role the plants play in the network. It is important to identify lead plants, and to exploit 
those plants as centers of excellence in the network. Yet at the same time, it is 
important to exploit some off-shore or server plants, since they offer strategic 
flexibility to the network. When business conditions change, they can fairly easily be 
replaced by other plants, in more favorable locations, offering new strategic 
advantages. 
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FIGURE 1 
Strategic role of the plant ( Ferdows, 1989; 1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16 
 
FIGURE 2 
Strategic role of plants in 1995-1996 
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FIGURE 3 
 
Location advantages of plants in 1995-1996 
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FIGURE 4 
 
Evolution of number of plants since 1995 
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FIGURE 5 
Strategic role of plants in 2005-2006 
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FIGURE 6 
 
Location advantages of plants in 2005 
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TABLE 1 
Evolution of location advantages since 1995 
 
 
primary advantage 1995 disappeared survived total 
labor 6 3 9 
know-how 0 1 1 
skill 1 6 7 
market 8 30 38 
none 3 1 4 
total 18 41 59 
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TABLE 2 
 
 
 History of location advantages in 2005 
 
 
primary advantage 2005 new survived total 
supply 6 1 7 
labor 4 4 8 
know-how 1 3 4 
skill 1 3 4 
market 28 24 52 
competition 2 0 2 
socio-political 0 2 2 
none 0 3 3 
total 42 401 82 
 
                                               
 
1
 Numbers in table 1 and 2 differ because of missing data 
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TABLE 3 
 
Level of strategic role 
 
 
in 1995-1996 N average level 
of strategic role 
mean 
difference 
significance 
level 
survived 41 5,09   
disappeared 18 3,52 1,58 0,02 
 
in 2005-2006 N average level 
of strategic role 
mean 
difference 
significance 
level 
Survived 27 5,67   
New 35 3,54 2,12 0,002 
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FIGURE 7 –  
Evolution of strategic role of plants since 1995 (plants that have disappeared are 
indicated in black) 
 
 
 
